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Census (1952-80) to measure federal spending in areas close to those in 
which many nonprofit organizations operate. 
For estimation, all dollar figures were converted to 1972 dollars using 
the GNP price deflator. The means for the entire sample and a subsample 
based on classes with average incomes $4000 and above are given below. 
Classes with average incomes below $4000 were omitted because of  the 
unusual circumstances that would typically be associated with very-low- 
income itemizers. 
Appendix B 
Means, Estimated Coeficients, Variances, and 
Covariances for  Individual Giving Equations, I975 
Variable  Mean 
10.4384 
6.39861 
-  0.55  167 1 
-  6.06453 
0.431233 
109.937 
Constan  t-elasticity  form 
In  G10  =  -  1.268 In P + 0.767 In  Y + . . . 
(0.052)  (0.018) 
(1)  (2) 
Relevant variances and covariances 
1  .OO27405  5  - 
2  .000810734  .OOO3265 16 
1  2 
Variable-elasticity  form 
In G10  = 0.706 In  Y + 4.306 In P - 0.538 In  Y In P 
(0.266)  (0.629)  (0.067) 
- 0.247 (In P)’ - 0.0140 (In  Y)’  + . . . 
(0.124)  (0.01  32) 291  Appendix C 
Relevant variances and covariances 
1  .0705098 
2  .132290  .395040 
1  2  3  4  5 
3  -  .0123079  -  .0408286  .00448628 
4  -  .00783861  -  .0462467  .00633514  .0152881 
5  -  .00346019  -  .00707766  .000686385  .000563653  ,000173322 
Appendix C 
Volunteering and Giving in a Simple Model of 
Individual Behavior 
The theory of labor supply provides a useful framework for incorporating 
decisions concerning giving and volunteering in the presence of an income 
tax. It is convenient to begin with an individual who values hours of lei- 
sure (HI),  hours spent volunteering (HJ,  his montary contributions (D), 
and the consumption of other goods (X): 
(Al) 
If this individual has a wage w,  faces a tax rate t,  and can itemize his de- 
ductions in calculating taxable income, his budget constraint is 
(A21 
where Ho  is the total number of hours available and I is exogenous non- 
wage income. Where U,  is the marginal utility of X, U,  is the marginal util- 
ity of Hv,  and so forth, the familiar first-order conditions assuming interi- 
or solutions are: 
(A31 
u = U(X,  D,  Hv, HI). 
x  = [W(HO - HI  - H") + z -  D](l-t), 
u, - p  = 0, 
(A41  uo  -  p (1-t)  = 0, 
(AS)  U"  -  p (1-t)w  = 0, 
(A61  UI  - p (1 -t)w = 0. 
The tax's incentive effect on donations is shown by the fact that in equi- 
librium the marginal rate of substitution between dollars spent on con- 
sumption and dollars donated is  UD/UX  = (1 -  t)  rather than one. The 
marginal  rate  of  substitution  between  volunteering  and  donations  is 
Uv/UD  = w,  the same that it would be in the absence of taxation. For this 